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ABSTRACT
Adversarial training and its variants have become de facto standards for learning
robust deep neural networks. In this paper, we explore the landscape around ad-
versarial training in a bid to uncover its limits. We systematically study the effect
of different training losses, model sizes, activation functions, the addition of unla-
beled data (through pseudo-labeling) and other factors on adversarial robustness.
We discover that it is possible to train robust models that go well beyond state-
of-the-art results by combining larger models, Swish/SiLU activations and model
weight averaging. We demonstrate large improvements on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 against `∞ and `2 norm-bounded perturbations of size 8/255 and 128/255,
respectively. In the setting with additional unlabeled data, we obtain an accu-
racy under attack of 65.87% against `∞ perturbations of size 8/255 on CIFAR-10
(+6.34% with respect to prior art). Without additional data, we obtain an accuracy
under attack of 56.43% (+2.69%). To test the generality of our findings and with-
out any additional modifications, we obtain an accuracy under attack of 80.45%
(+7.58%) against `2 perturbations of size 128/255 on CIFAR-10, and of 37.70%
(+9.28%) against `∞ perturbations of size 8/255 on CIFAR-100.
1 INTRODUCTION
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Figure 1: Accuracy of various models ordered by
publication date against AUTOATTACK (Croce &
Hein, 2020) on CIFAR-10 with `∞ perturbations
of size 8/255. Our newest models (on the far
right) improve robust accuracy by +2.69% with-
out additional data and by +6.34% when using ad-
ditional unlabeled data.
Neural networks are being deployed in a
wide variety of applications with great success
(Goodfellow et al., 2016; Krizhevsky et al.,
2012; Hinton et al., 2012). As neural net-
works tackle challenges ranging from ranking
content on the web (Covington et al., 2016)
to autonomous driving (Bojarski et al., 2016)
via medical diagnostics (De Fauw et al., 2018),
it has become increasingly important to en-
sure that deployed models are robust and gen-
eralize to various input perturbations. Despite
their success, neural networks are not intrin-
sically robust. In particular, the addition of
small but carefully chosen deviations to the in-
put, called adversarial perturbations, can cause
the neural network to make incorrect predic-
tions with high confidence (Carlini & Wag-
ner, 2017a; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin
et al., 2016; Szegedy et al., 2013). Starting with
Szegedy et al. (2013), there has been a lot of
work on understanding and generating adver-
sarial perturbations (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b;
Athalye & Sutskever, 2017), and on building
models that are robust to such perturbations (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Papernot et al., 2015; Madry
et al., 2017; Kannan et al., 2018). Robust optimization techniques, like the one developed by Madry
et al. (2017), learn robust models by finding worst-case adversarial examples (by running an inner
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optimization procedure) at each training step and adding them to the training data. This technique
has proven to be effective and is now widely adopted.
Since Madry et al. (2017), various modifications to their algorithm have been proposed (Xie et al.,
2018; Pang et al., 2020; Huang et al., 2020; Qin et al., 2019; Zoran et al., 2019; Andriushchenko &
Flammarion, 2020). We highlight the work by Zhang et al. (2019a) who proposed TRADES which
balances the trade-off between standard and robust accuracy, and the work by Carmon et al. (2019);
Uesato et al. (2019); Najafi et al. (2019); Zhai et al. (2019) who simultaneously proposed the use of
additional unlabeled data in this context. As shown in Fig. 1, despite this flurry of activity, progress
over the past two years has been slow. In a similar spirit to works exploring transfer learning (Raffel
et al., 2019) or recurrent architectures (Jozefowicz et al., 2015), we perform a systematic study
around the landscape of adversarial training in a bid to discover its limits. Concretely, we study
the effects of (i) the objective used in the inner and outer optimization procedures, (ii) the quantity
and quality of additional unlabeled data, (iii) the model size, as well as (iv) other factors (such as
the use of model weight averaging). In total we trained more than 150 adversarially robust models
and dissected each of them to uncover new ideas that could improve adversarial training and our
understanding of robustness. Here is a non-exhaustive list highlighting our findings (in no specific
order):
• TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019a) combined with early stopping outperforms regular adversarial
training (as proposed by Madry et al., 2017). This is in contrast to the observations made by
Rice et al. (2020) (Sec. 4.1).
• As observed by Xie & Yuille (2019b); Uesato et al. (2019), increasing the capacity of models
improves robustness (Sec. 4.4).
• The choice of activation function matters. Similar to observations made by Xie et al. (2020b),
we found that Swish/SiLU (Ramachandran et al., 2017; Elfwing et al., 2017) performs best.
However, in contrast to Xie et al., we found that other “smooth” activation functions do not
necessarily improve robustness (Sec. 4.5.2).
• The way in which additional unlabeled data is selected (i.e., how additional images are extracted
from the 80 Million Tiny Images dataset 80M-TI; Torralba et al., 2008) and ingested during
training (i.e., how they are used during training) can have a significant impact (Sec. 4.3).
• Model weight averaging (WA) (Izmailov et al., 2018) consistently provides a boost in robustness.
In the setting without additional unlabeled data, WA provides improvements as large as those
provided by TRADES on top of classical adversarial training (Sec. 4.5.1).
These findings result in a suite of models that significantly improve on the state-of-the-art against
`∞ and `2 norm-bounded perturbations on CIFAR-10, and against `∞ norm-bounded perturbations
on CIFAR-100 (as measured by AUTOATTACK):1
• On CIFAR-10 against `∞ norm-bounded perturbations of size  = 8/255, we train models with
65.87% and 56.43% robust accuracy with and without additional unlabeled data, respectively (at
the time of writing, prior art was 59.53% and 53.74% in both settings).
• With the same settings used for CIFAR-10 against `∞ norm-bounded perturbations, on CIFAR-
10 against `2 norm-bounded perturbations of size  = 128/255, we train models with 80.45%
and 73.57% robust accuracy with and without additional unlabeled data, respectively (prior art
was 72.91% and 69.24%).
• On CIFAR-100 against `∞ norm-bounded perturbations of size  = 8/255, we train models with
37.70% and 30.54% robust accuracy with and without additional unlabeled data, respectively
(prior art was 28.42% and 18.95%).
In this study, we aim to find the current limits of adversarial robustness. What we found was that an
accumulation of small factors can significantly improve upon the state-of-the-art when combined.
As fundamentally new techniques might be needed, it is important to understand the limitations of
current approaches. We hope that this new set of baselines can further new understanding about
adversarial robustness.
1https://github.com/fra31/auto-attack
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2 BACKGROUND
2.1 CONTEXT
Adversarial attacks. Since Szegedy et al. (2013) observed that neural networks which achieve
high accuracy on test data are highly vulnerable to adversarial examples, the art of crafting increas-
ingly sophisticated adversarial examples has received a lot of attention. Goodfellow et al. (2014)
proposed the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) which generates adversarial examples with a sin-
gle normalized gradient step. It was followed by R+FGSM (Trame`r et al., 2017), which adds a ran-
domization step, and the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin et al., 2016), which takes multiple
smaller gradient steps. These are often grouped under the term Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
which usually refers to the optimization procedure used to search norm-bounded perturbations.
Adversarial training as a defense. The adversarial training procedure which feeds adversarially
perturbed examples back into the training data is widely regarded as one of the most successful
method to train robust deep neural networks. Its classical version detailed by Madry et al. (2017)
has been augmented in different ways – with changes in the attack procedure (e.g., by incorporating
momentum; Dong et al., 2017), loss function (e.g., logit pairing; Mosbach et al., 2018) or model
architecture (e.g., feature denoising; Xie et al., 2018). Other notable works include the work by
Zhang et al. (2019a) who proposed TRADES which balances the trade-off between standard and
robust accuracy, and the work by Wang et al. (2020) who proposed MART which also addresses this
trade-off by using boosted loss functions. Both works achieved state-of-the-art performance against
`∞ norm-bounded perturbations on CIFAR-10. The work from Rice et al. (2020) stood out as a
study on robust overfitting which demonstrated that improvements similar to TRADES and MART
could be obtained more easily using classical adversarial training with early stopping. This study
revealed that there is much we do not yet understand about adversarial training, and serves as one of
our motivations for performing a holistic analysis of different aspects of adversarial training. So far,
to the best our knowledge, there has been no systematic study of adversarial training.
Other defenses. Many other alternative defenses are not covered in the scope of this paper. They
range from preprocessing techniques (Guo et al., 2017; Buckman et al., 2018) to detection algo-
rithms (Metzen et al., 2017; Feinman et al., 2017), and also include the definition of new regulariz-
ers (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2018; Xiao et al., 2018; Qin et al., 2019). The difficulty of adversarial
evaluation also drove the need for certified defenses (Wong et al., 2018; Mirman et al., 2018; Gowal
et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019b; Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019), but the guarantees that
these techniques provide do not yet match the empirical robustness obtained through adversarial
training.
Adversarial evaluation. It is worth noting that many of the defense strategies proposed in the
literature (Papernot et al., 2015; Lu et al., 2017; Kannan et al., 2018; Tao et al., 2018; Zhang & Wang,
2019) were broken by stronger adversaries (Carlini & Wagner, 2016; 2017b; Athalye & Sutskever,
2017; Engstrom et al., 2018; Carlini, 2019; Uesato et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018). Hence, the
robust accuracy obtained under different evaluation protocols cannot be easily compared and care
has to be taken to make sure the evaluation is as strong as is possible (Carlini et al., 2019). In this
manuscript, we evaluate each model against two of the strongest adversarial attacks, AUTOATTACK
and MULTITARGETED, developed by Croce & Hein (2020) and Gowal et al. (2019), respectively.
2.2 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Madry et al. (2017) formulate a saddle point problem whose goal is to find model parameters θ that
minimize the adversarial risk:
argmin
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
l(f(x+ δ;θ), y)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
inner maximization︸ ︷︷ ︸
outer minimization
(1)
whereD is a data distribution over pairs of examples x and corresponding labels y, f(·;θ) is a model
parametrized by θ, l is a suitable loss function (such as the 0− 1 loss in the context of classification
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tasks), and S defines the set of allowed perturbations (i.e., the adversarial input set or threat model).
For `p norm-bounded perturbations of size , the adversarial set is defined as Sp = {δ | ‖δ‖p < }.
Hence, for `∞ norm-bounded perturbations S = S∞ and for `2 norm-bounded perturbations S = S2
PGD for inner maximization. As finding the optimum of the inner maximization problem is NP-
hard, several methods (also known as “attacks”) have been proposed to approximate its solution.
Madry et al. (2017) use PGD,2 which replaces the non-differentiable 0 − 1 loss l with the cross-
entropy loss lxent and computes an adversarial perturbation δˆ = δ(K) in K gradient ascent steps of
size α as
δ(k+1) ← projS
(
δ(k) + α sign
(
∇δ(t) lxent(f(x+ δ(k);θ), y)
))
(2)
where δ(0) is chosen at random within S, and where projA(a) projects a point a back onto a set A,
projA(a) = argmina′∈A‖a−a′‖2. We will refer to this inner optimization procedure with K steps
as PGDK .
Outer minimization. For each example x with label y, adversarial training minimizes the loss
given by
LATθ = lxent(f(x+ δˆ;θ), y) ≈ max
δ∈S
lxent(f(x+ δ;θ), y) (3)
where δˆ is given by Eq. 2 and lxent is the softmax cross-entropy loss.
3 SETUP AND IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
Initially, we focus on robustness to `∞ norm-bounded perturbations on CIFAR-10 of size  = 8/255.
Sec. 5 combines individual components to surpass the state-of-the-art and tests their generality
against another dataset (i.e., CIFAR-100) and another threat model (i.e., `2 norm-bounded perturba-
tions of size  = 128/255). First, we describe the experimental setup.
3.1 SETUP
Architecture. For consistency with prior work on adversarial robustness (Madry et al., 2017; Rice
et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2019a; Uesato et al., 2019), we use Wide ResNet (WRN) (He et al., 2015;
Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016). Our baseline model (on which most experiments are performed)
is 28 layers deep with a width multiplier of 10, and is denoted by WRN-28-10. We also use deeper
(up to 70 layers) and wider (up to 20) models. Our largest model is a WRN-70-16 containing 267M
parameters, our smallest model is a WRN-28-10 containing 36M parameters. A popular option in
the literature is the WRN-34-20, which contains 186M parameters.
Outer minimization. We use Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) with Nesterov momen-
tum (Polyak, 1964; Nesterov, 1983). The initial learning rate of 0.1 is decayed by 10× half-way
and three-quarters-of-the-way through training (we refer to this schedule as the multistep schedule).
We use a global weight decay parameter of 5 × 10−4. In the basic setting without additional unla-
beled data, we use a batch size of 128 and train for 200 epochs (i.e., 78K steps). With additional
unlabeled data, we use a batch size of 1024 with 512 samples from CIFAR-10 and 512 samples from
a subset of 500K images extracted from the tiny images dataset 80M-TI (Torralba et al., 2008) 3
and train for 19.5K steps (i.e., 400 CIFAR-10-equivalent epochs). To use the unlabeled data with
adversarial training, we use the pseudo-labeling mechanism presented by Carmon et al. (2019): a
separate non-robust classifier is trained on clean data from CIFAR-10 to provide labels to the unla-
beled samples (the dataset created by Carmon et al., 2019 is already annotated with such labels). Our
batches are split over 32 Google Cloud TPU v3 cores. As is common on CIFAR-10, we augment our
samples with random crops (i.e., pad by 4 pixels and crop back to 32 × 32) and random horizontal
flips.
2There exists a few variants of PGD which normalize the gradient step differently (e.g., using an `2 normal-
ization for `2 norm-bounded perturbations).
3We use the dataset from Carmon et al. (2019) available at https://github.com/yaircarmon/semisup-adv.
4
Preprint
Inner maximization. The inner maximization in Eq. 3 is implemented using PGD10.4 We used a
step-size α of 2/255 and 15/255 for `∞ and `2 norm-bounded perturbations, respectively. With this
setup, training without additional data takes approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes for a WRN-28-10
(peak accuracy as measured on a validation set disjoint from the test set is obtained after 1 hour and
15 minutes; for a WRN-70-16 peak accuracy is obtained after 4 hours). With additional unlabeled
data, training takes approximately 2 hours.
Evaluation protocol. As adversarial training is a bit more noisy than regular training, for each
hyperparameter setting, we train two models. Throughout training we measure the robust accuracy
using PGD40 on 1024 samples from a separate validation set (disjoint from the training and test set).
Similarly to Rice et al. (2020), we perform early stopping by keeping track of model parameters that
achieve the highest robust accuracy (i.e., lowest adversarial risk as shown in Eq. 1) on the validation
set. From both models, we pick the one with highest robust accuracy on the validation set and use
this model for a further more thorough evaluation. Finally, the robust accuracy is reported on the full
test set against a mixture of AUTOATTACK (Croce & Hein, 2020) and MULTITARGETED (Gowal
et al., 2019). We execute the following sequence of attacks: AUTOPGD on the cross-entropy loss
with 5 restarts and 100 steps, AUTOPGD on the difference of logits ratio loss with 5 restarts and
100 steps, MULTITARGETED on the margin loss with 10 restarts and 200 steps.5 We also report the
clean accuracy which is the top-1 accuracy without adversarial perturbations.
3.2 BASELINE.
As a comparison point, we train a WRN-28-10 ten times with the default settings given above for
both the CIFAR-10-only and the additional data settings. The resulting robust accuracy on the test
set is 50.80±0.23% (for CIFAR-10-only) and 58.41±0.25% (with additional unlabeled data). When
using a WRN-34-20, we obtain 52.91% which is in line with the model obtained by Rice et al. (2020)
for the same settings (i.e., 53.38%). When using TRADES (instead of regular adversarial training)
in the additional data setting, we obtain 59.45% which is in line with the model obtain by Carmon
et al. (2019) for the same settings (i.e., 59.47%). As our pipeline is implemented in JAX (Bradbury
et al., 2018) and Haiku (Hennigan et al., 2020), we do not exclude some slight differences in data
preprocessing and network initialization.
4 EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
The following sections detail different independent experiments. Each section is self-contained to
allow the reader to jump to any section of interest. The outline is as follows:
4.1 Losses for Outer minimization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2 Inner maximization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.1 Inner maximization loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.2 Inner maximization perturbation radius. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3 Additional unlabeled data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.1 Quality and quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.2 Ratio of labeled-to-unlabelled data per batch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4 Effects of scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.5 Other tricks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5.1 Model weight averaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5.2 Activation functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4Unless special care is taken (Wong et al., 2020), using less than 7 steps often results in gradient obfuscated
models (Qin et al., 2019), using more steps did not provide any improvements in our experiments
5For reference, the AUTOATTACK leaderboard at https://github.com/fra31/auto-attack evaluates the model from
Rice et al. (2020) to 53.42%, while this evaluation computes a robust accuracy of 53.38% for the same model.
The AUTOATTACK leaderboard also evaluates the model from Carmon et al. (2019) to 59.53%, while this
evaluation computes a robust accuracy of 59.47% for the same model.
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Table 1: Clean (without perturbations) and robust (under adversarial attack) accuracy obtained by Adversarial
Training (AT), TRADES and MART trained on CIFAR-10 (with and without additional unlabeled data) against
`∞ norm-bounded perturbations of size  = 8/255.
CIFAR-10 with 80M-TI
SETUP CLEAN ROBUST CLEAN ROBUST
AT (Madry et al., 2017) 84.85±1.20% 50.80±0.23% 90.93±0.25% 58.41±0.25%
TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019a) 82.74% 51.91% 88.36% 59.45%
MART (Wang et al., 2020) 80.51% 51.93% 90.45% 58.25%
4.1 LOSSES FOR OUTER MINIMIZATION.
As explained in Sec. 2.2, adversarial training as proposed by Madry et al. (2017) aims to minimize
the loss given in Eq. 3 and is usually implemented as
LATθ = lxent(f(x+ δˆ;θ), y), where δˆ ≈ argmax
δ∈S
lxent(f(x+ δ;θ), y). (4)
Here lxent denotes the cross-entropy loss and δˆ is treated as a constant (i.e., there is no back-
propagation through the inner optimization procedure). One of most successful variant of adver-
sarial training is TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019a) which derives a theoretically grounded regularizer
that balances the trade-off between standard and robust accuracy. The overall loss used by TRADES
is given by
LTRADESθ = lxent(f(x;θ), y) + βmax
δ∈S
DKL(f(x+ δ;θ), f(x;θ)), (5)
where DKL denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence. TRADES is one of the core components used
by Carmon et al. (2019) within RST and by Uesato et al. (2018) within UAT-OT. A follow-up work
(Wang et al., 2020), known as Misclassification Aware Adversarial Training (MART), introduced a
boosted loss that differentiates between the misclassified and correctly classified examples in a bid
to improve this trade-off further. We invite the reader to refer to Wang et al. (2020) for more details.
Results. Table 1 shows the performance of TRADES and MART compared to adversarial training
(AT). We observe that while TRADES systematically improves upon AT in both data settings, this is
not the case for MART. We find that MART has the propensity to create moderate forms of gradient
masking against weak attacks like PGD20. In one extreme case, a WRN-70-16 trained with addi-
tional unlabeled data using MART obtained an accuracy of 71.08% against PGD20 which dropped
to 60.63% against our stronger suite of attacks (this finding is consistent with the AutoAttack leader-
board at https://github.com/fra31/auto-attack).
Key takeaways. Contrary to the suggestion of Rice et al. (2020) (i.e., “the original PGD-based
adversarial training method can actually achieve the same robust performance as state-of-the-art
method”, see Sec. 2.1), TRADES (when combined with early-stopping – as our setup dictates) is
more competitive than classical adversarial training. The results also highlight the importance of
strong evaluations beyond PGD20 (including evaluations of the validation set used for early stop-
ping).
4.2 INNER MAXIMIZATION
4.2.1 INNER MAXIMIZATION LOSS
Most works use the same loss (e.g., cross-entropy loss or Kullback-Leibler divergence) for solving
the inner maximization problem (i.e., finding an adversarial example) and the outer minimization
problem (i.e., training the neural network). However, there are many plausible approximations for
the inner maximization. For example, instead of using the cross-entropy loss or Kullback-Leibler
divergence for the inner maximization, Uesato et al. (2018) used the margin loss maxi 6=y f(x;θ)i−
f(x;θ)y which improved attack convergence speed. Similarly, we could mix the cross-entropy loss
6
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with TRADES via the following:
LTRADES-XENTθ = lxent(f(x;θ), y) + βDKL(f(x+ δˆ;θ), f(x;θ)) where (6)
δˆ ≈ argmax
δ∈S
lxent(f(x+ δ;θ), y).
Or mix the Kullback-Leibler divergence with classical adversarial training:
LAT-KLθ = lxent(f(x+ δˆ;θ), y) where δˆ ≈ argmax
δ∈S
DKL(f(x+ δ;θ), f(x;θ)). (7)
Below are our observations on the effects of robustness and clean accuracy when we combine dif-
ferent inner and outer optimisation losses.
Results. Table 2 shows the performance of different inner and outer loss combinations. Each
combination is evaluated against two adversaries: a weaker PGD40 attack using the margin loss
(and denoted by PGD40margin) and our stronger combination of attacks (as detailed in Sec. 3.1 and
denoted AA+MT). The first observation is that TRADES obtains higher robust accuracy compared
to classical adversarial training (AT) across most combinations of inner losses. We note that the
clean accuracy is higher for AT compared to TRADES and address this trade-off in the next section
(Sec. 4.2.2). In the low-data setting, the combination of TRADES with cross-entropy (TRADES-
XENT) yields the best robust accuracy. In the high-data setting, we obtain higher robust accuracy
using TRADES-KL.
Our second observation is that using margin loss during training can show signs of gradient mask-
ing: models trained using margin loss show higher degradation in robust accuracy when evaluated
against the stronger adversary (AA+MT) as opposed to the weaker PGD40margin. Table 2 shows that
the drop in robust accuracy can be as high as -6.35%.6 This level of gradient masking is most promi-
nent in AT-MARGIN and is slightly mitigated when we use TRADES for the outer minimization.
This degradation in robust accuracy is significantly reduced when we use cross-entropy as the inner
maximization loss.
Key takeaways. Similarly to the observation made in Sec. 4.1, TRADES obtains higher adver-
sarial accuracy compared to classical adversarial training. We found that using margin loss during
training (for the inner maximization procedure) creates noticeable gradient masking.
4.2.2 INNER MAXIMIZATION PERTURBATION RADIUS.
Several works explored the use of larger (Gowal et al., 2018) or adaptive (Balaji et al., 2019) pertur-
bation radii. Like TRADES, using different perturbation radii is an attempt to bias the clean to robust
accuracy trade-off: as we increase the training perturbation radius we expect increased robustness
and lower clean accuracy.
6Using margin loss for evaluation is not uncommon, since it has been suggested to yield a stronger adversary
(see Carlini & Wagner, 2017b; Liu et al., 2016).
Table 2: Clean (without perturbations) and robust (under adversarial attack) accuracy obtained by TRADES
and Adversarial Training (AT) with different inner losses trained on CIFAR-10 (with and without additional
unlabeled data) against `∞ norm-bounded perturbations of size  = 8/255. The robust accuracy is measured
using PGD40 with a margin loss (PGD40margin) and our combination of AUTOATTACK and MULTITARGETED
(AA+MT).
CIFAR-10 with 80M-TI
SETUP CLEAN PGD40margin AA+MT CLEAN PGD
40
margin AA+MT
AT-XENT (Madry et al., 2017) 84.85% 53.87% 50.80% 90.93% 61.46% 58.41%
AT-KL 88.21% 50.67% 48.53% 91.86% 59.49% 56.89%
AT-MARGIN 85.12% 54.72% 48.79% 90.01% 61.53% 55.18%
TRADES-XENT 83.01% 54.19% 52.76% 89.12% 61.25% 58.98%
TRADES-KL (Zhang et al., 2019a) 82.74% 53.85% 51.91% 88.36% 61.11% 59.45%
TRADES-MARGIN 81.60% 54.47% 51.28% 86.88% 61.37% 57.82%
7
Preprint
Table 3: Clean (without perturbations) and robust (under adversarial attack) accuracy obtained on CIFAR-10
(with and without additional unlabeled data) against `∞ norm-bounded perturbations of size  = 8/255 when
using different perturbation radii for the inner maximization trained.
CIFAR-10 with 80M-TI
SETUP CLEAN ROBUST CLEAN ROBUST
AT  = 8/255 (Madry et al., 2017) 84.85±1.20% 50.80±0.23% 90.93±0.25% 58.41±0.25%
AT  = 8.8/255 82.13% 51.65% 90.16% 58.72%
AT  = 9.6/255 83.60% 51.81% 89.39% 58.77%
TRADES  = 8/255 (Zhang et al., 2019a) 82.74% 51.91% 88.36% 59.45%
Results. Table 3 shows the effect of increasing the perturbation radius  by a factor 1.1× and
1.2× the original value of 8/255 (during training, not during evaluation). We notice that adverar-
ial training (AT) can close the gap to TRADES as we increase the perturbation radius (especially
in the low-data regime). Although not reported here, we noticed that TRADES does not get sim-
ilar improvements in performance with larger radii (possibly because TRADES is already actively
managing the trade-off with clean accuracy).
Key takeaways. Tuning the training perturbation radius can marginally improve robustness (when
using classical adversarial training). We posit that understanding when and how to use larger pertur-
bation radii might be critical towards our understanding of robust generalization. Work from Balaji
et al. (2019) do provide additional insights, but the topic remains largely under-explored.
4.3 ADDITIONAL UNLABELED DATA
After the work from Schmidt et al. (2018) which posits that robust generalization requires more
data, Hendrycks et al. (2019) demonstrated that one could leverage additional labeled data from
IMAGENET to improve the robust accuracy of models on CIFAR-10. Uesato et al. (2019) and
Carmon et al. (2019) were among the first to introduce additional unlabeled data to CIFAR-10 by
extracting images from 80M-TI (i.e., subset of high scoring images from a CIFAR-10 classifier).
Uesato et al. (2019) used 200K additional images to train their best model as they observed that
using more data (i.e., 500K images) worsen their results. This suggests that additional data needs to
be close enough to the original CIFAR-10 images to be useful. This is something already suggested
by Oliver et al. (2018) in the context of semi-supervised learning.
4.3.1 QUALITY AND QUANTITY
In this experiment, we use four different subsets of additional unlabeled images extracted from
80M-TI. The first set with 500K images is the additional data used by Carmon et al. (2019).7 The
second, third and fourth sets consist of 200K, 500K and 1M images regenerated using a process
similar to Carmon et al. (2019). To generate a dataset of size N , we remove duplicates from the
CIFAR-10 test set, score the remaining images using a standard CIFAR-10 classifier, and pick the
top-N/10 scoring images from each class. Hence, the dataset with 500K images contains all the
images from the dataset with 200K images and, similarly, the dataset with 1M images contains all
the images from the dataset with 500K images. As the datasets increase in size, the images they
contain may become less relevant to the CIFAR-10 classification task (as their standard classifier
score becomes smaller). We will publish our datasets along with our models shortly.
Table 4: Accuracy under `∞ attacks of size  =
8/255 on CIFAR-10 as the quantity of unlabeled
data increases.
QUANTITY CLEAN ROBUST
500K (Carmon et al., 2019) 90.93% 58.41%
200K (regenerated) 90.95% 57.29%
500K (regenerated) 90.68% 59.12%
1M (regenerated) 91.00% 58.89%
Results. Table 4 shows the performance of
adversarial training with pseudo-labeling as the
quantity of additional unlabeled data increases.
This training scheme is identical to UAT-FT
(as introduced by Uesato et al., 2019) and is
slightly different to the one proposed in Carmon
et al. (2019) (which used TRADES). Firstly, we
note that our regenerated set of 500K images
7https://github.com/yaircarmon/semisup-adv
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improves robustness (+0.71%) compared to Carmon et al. (2019). Secondly, similar to the observa-
tions made by Uesato et al. (2019), there is a sweet spot where additional data is maximally useful.
Going from 200K to 500K additional images improves robust accuracy by +1.83%. However, in-
creasing the amount of additional images further to 1M is detrimental (-0.23%). This suggests that
more data improves robustness as long as the additional images relate to the original CIFAR-10
dataset (e.g., the more images we extract, the less likely it is that these images correspond to classes
within CIFAR-10).
Key takeaways. Small differences (e.g., different classifiers used for pseudo-labeling) in the pro-
cess that extracts additional unlabeled data can have significant impact on robustness (i.e., models
trained on our regenerated dataset obtain higher robust accuracy than those trained with the data
from Carmon et al., 2019). There is also a trade-off between the quantity and the quality of the extra
unlabeled data (i.e., increasing the amount of unlabeled data to 1M did not increase robustness).
4.3.2 RATIO OF LABELED-TO-UNLABELLED DATA PER BATCH
In this section, all the experiments use the unlabeled data from Carmon et al. (2019). In the baseline
setting, as done in Carmon et al. (2019), each batch during training uses 50% labeled data and the
rest for unlabeled data. This effectively downweighs unlabeled images by a factor 10×, as we have
50K labeled images and 500K unlabeled images. Increasing this ratio reduces the weight given to
additional data and puts more emphasis of the original CIFAR-10 images.
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Figure 2: Accuracy under `∞ attacks of size  =
8/255 on CIFAR-10 as we varying the ratio of
labeled-to-unlabeled data.
Results. Fig. 2 shows the robust accuracy
as we vary that ratio. We observe that giv-
ing slightly more importance to unlabeled data
helps. More concretely, we find an optimal ra-
tio of labeled-to-unlabeled data of 3:7, which
provides a boost of +0.95% over the 1:1 ra-
tio. This suggest that the additional data ex-
tracted by Carmon et al. (2019) is well aligned
with the original CIFAR-10 data and that we
can improve robust generalization by allowing
the model to see this additional data more fre-
quently. Increasing this ratio (i.e., reducing the
importance of the unlabeled data) gradually de-
grades robustness and, eventually, the robust
accuracy matches the one obtained by models
trained without additional data.
We also experimented with label smoothing
(for both labeled and unlabeled data indepen-
dently). Label smoothing should counteract the effect of the noisy labels resulting from the classifier
used in the pseudo-labeling process. However, we did not observe improvements in performance
for any of the settings tried.
Key takeaways. Tuning the weight given to unlabeled examples (by varying the labeled-to-
unlabeled data ratio per batch) can provide improvements in robustness. This experiment highlight
that a careful treatment of the extra unlabeled data can provide improvements in adversarial robust-
ness.
4.4 EFFECTS OF SCALE
Rice et al. (2020) observed that increasing the model width improves robust accuracy despite the
phenomenon of robust overfitting (which favors the use of early stopping in adversarial training).
Uesato et al. (2019) also trialed deeper models with a WRN-106-8 and observed improved robust-
ness. A most systematic study of the effect of network depth was also conducted by Xie & Yuille
(2019a) on IMAGENET (scaling a ResNet to 638 layers). However, there have not been any con-
trolled experiments on CIFAR-10 that varied both depth and width of WRNs. We note that most
work on adversarial robustness on CIFAR-10 use either a WRN-34-10 or a WRN-28-10 network.
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Figure 3: Clean accuracy and accuracy under `∞ attacks of size  = 8/255 on CIFAR-10 as the
network architecture changes. Panel a restricts the available data to CIFAR-10, while panel b uses
500K additional unlabeled images extracted from 80M-TI.
Results. Fig. 3 shows the effect of increasing the depth and width of our baseline network. It
is possible to observe that, while both depth and width increase the number of effective model
parameters, they do not always provide the same effect on robustness. For example, a WRN-46-15
which trains in roughly the same time as a WRN-28-20 (about 5 hours in our setup) reaches higher
robust accuracy: +0.96% and +0.66% on the settings without and with additional data, respectively.
Table 6 in the appendix also shows that the clean accuracy also improves as networks become larger.
Key takeaways. Larger models provide improved robustness (Xie & Yuille, 2019b; Uesato et al.,
2019) and, for identical parameter count, deeper models can perform better.
4.5 OTHER TRICKS
4.5.1 MODEL WEIGHT AVERAGING
Model Weight Averaging (WA) (Izmailov et al., 2018) is widely used in classical training (Tan & Le,
2019), and leads to better generalization. The WA procedure finds much flatter solutions than SGD,
and approximates ensembling with a single model. To the best of our knowledge, the effect of WA
on robustness have not been studied in the literature. Ensembling has received some attention (Pang
et al., 2019; Strauss et al., 2017), but requires training multiple models. We implement WA using
an exponential moving average θ′ of the model parameters θ with a decay rate τ : we execute
θ′ ← τ · θ′ + (1 − τ) · θ at each training step. During evaluation, the weighted parameters θ′ are
used instead of the trained parameters θ.
Results. Fig. 4 summarizes the performance of model weight averaging (detailed results are in Ta-
ble 7 in the appendix). Panel 4a demonstrates significant improvements in robustness: +1.41% and
+0.73% with respect to the baseline without WA for settings without and with additional data, re-
spectively. In fact, in the low-data regime, WA provides an improvement similar to that of TRADES
(+1.11%). A possible explanation for this phenomena is possibly given by panel 4b. We observe that
not only that WA achieves higher robust accuracy, but also that it maintains this higher accuracy over
a few training epochs (about 25 epochs). This reduces the sensitivity to early stopping which may
miss the most robust checkpoint (happening shortly after the second learning rate decay). Another
important benefit of WA is its rapid convergence to about 50% robust accuracy (against PGD40)
in the early stages of training, which suggests that it could be combined with efficient adversarial
training techniques such as the one presented by Wong et al. (2020).
Key takeaways. Although widely used for standard training, WA has not been explored within
adversarial training. We discover that WA provides sizeable improvements in robustness and hope
that future work can explore this phenomenon.
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Figure 4: Accuracy under `∞ attacks of size  = 8/255 on CIFAR-10 when using model weight
averaging (WA). Panel a shows the final robust accuracy obtained for different values of the decay
rate τ for the settings without (blue and left y-axis) and with additional unlabeled data (orange and
right y-axis). Panel b shows the evolution of the robust accuracy as training progresses.
4.5.2 ACTIVATION FUNCTIONS
With the exception from work by Xie et al. (2020a) which focused on IMAGENET, there have been
little to no investigations into the effect of different activation functions on adversarial training. Xie
et al. (2020a) discovered that “smooth” activation functions yielded higher robustness when using
weak adversaries during training (PGD with a low number of steps). In particular, they posit that they
allow adversarial training to find harder adversarial examples and compute better gradient updates.
Qin et al. (2019) also experimented with softplus activations with success.
Results. While we observe in Fig. 5 that activation functions other than ReLU (Nair & Hinton,
2010) can positively affect clean and robust accuracy, the trend is not as clear as the one observed
by Xie et al. (2020a) on IMAGENET. In fact, apart from Swish/SiLU (Ramachandran et al., 2017;
Elfwing et al., 2017), which provides improvements of +0.8% and +1.13% in the settings without
and with additional unlabeled data, the order of the best performing activation functions changes
when we go from the CIFAR-10-only setting to the setting with additional unlabeled data. Overall,
ReLU remains a good choice.
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Figure 5: Clean accuracy and accuracy under `∞ attacks of size  = 8/255 on CIFAR-10 for
different activation functions. Panel a restricts the available data to CIFAR-10, while panel b uses
500K additional unlabeled images extracted from 80M-TI.
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Key takeaways. The choice of activation function matters: we found that while Swish/SiLU
performs best in our experiments, other “smooth” activation functions (Xie et al., 2020b) do not
necessarily correlate positively with robustness in our experiments.
5 A NEW STATE-OF-THE-ART
To evaluate the combined effects of our findings, we train a single model according to the key
takeaways from each section. We hope that this exercise can provide valuable insights. In particular,
we combine the following elements: (i) TRADES as detailed by Zhang et al. (2019a), (ii) model
weight averaging with τ = 0.995, (iii) a larger model with a WRN-70-16 (we also evaluate smaller
models on CIFAR-10 against `∞ norm-bounded perturbations), (iv) Swish/SiLU activations. In
the setting without additional labeled data, we use the multistep learning rate schedule (as detailed
in Sec. 3.1). In the setting with additional labeled data, we preferred the cosine decay learning rate
schedule (Loshchilov & Hutter, 2017) without restarts (which was better than multistep when the
model size increased beyond WRN-28-10). We also used a labeled-to-unlabeled ratio of 3:7. Except
for WA, which adds a small computational and memory cost, all other modifications are free.
Table 5 shows the results as well as the known state-of-the-art. On CIFAR-10 against `∞ norm-
bounded perturbations of size  = 8/255, we improve state-of-the-art robust accuracy by +2.69%
and +6.34% without and with additional data, respectively. At equal model size, we improve robust
accuracy by +2.3% and +3.29%, respectively. Most notably, without additional data, we improve on
the results of three methods that used additional data (Hendrycks et al., 2019; Uesato et al., 2019;
Wang et al., 2020). With additional data, we surpass the barrier of 60% for the first time.
To test the generality of our findings, we keep the same hyper-parameters and train adversarially
robust models on CIFAR-10 against `2 norm-bounded perturbations of size  = 128/255 and on
CIFAR-100 against `∞ norm-bounded perturbations of size  = 8/255.8 In the four cases (with and
without additional data), we surpass the known state-of-the-art by significant margins.9
8For CIFAR-100, we extract new additional unlabeled data by excluding images from its test set.
9All model parameters will be made available online shortly.
Table 5: Clean (without perturbations) and robust (under adversarial attack) accuracy obtained by different se-
tups trained on CIFAR-10 (with and without additional unlabeled data) against `∞ norm-bounded perturbations
of size  = 8/255. The accuracies are reported on the full CIFAR-10 test set. Cells with an asterisk “*” show
reported numbers computed by an attack similar in strength to ours (see https://github.com/fra31/auto-attack).
MODEL DATASET NORM RADIUS CLEAN PGD40 AA+MT
WITHOUT 80M-TI
Pang et al. (2020) (WRN-34-20)
CIFAR-10 `∞  = 8/255
85.14% – 53.74%*
Ours (WRN-70-16) 84.33% 58.04% 56.43%
Ours (WRN-34-20) 84.56% 57.45% 56.04%
Engstrom et al. (2019) (ResNet-50) CIFAR-10 `2  = 128/255
90.83% – 69.24%*
Ours (WRN-70-16) 89.37% 74.89% 73.57%
Rice et al. (2020) (ResNet-18) CIFAR-100 `∞  = 8/255
53.83% – 18.95%*
Ours (WRN-70-16) 61.01% 31.47% 30.54%
WITH ADDITIONAL UNLABELED DATA FROM 80M-TI
Carmon et al. (2019) (WRN-28-10)
CIFAR-10 `∞  = 8/255
89.69% – 59.47%
Ours (WRN-70-16) 91.10% 67.16% 65.87%
Ours (data from Carmon et al., 2019) 90.95% 66.70% 65.06%
Ours (WRN-28-10) 89.48% 64.08% 62.76%
Augustin et al. (2020) (ResNet-50) CIFAR-10 `2  = 128/255
91.08% – 72.91%*
Ours (WRN-70-16) 94.74% 82.19% 80.45%
Hendrycks et al. (2019) (ResNet-18) CIFAR-100 `∞  = 8/255
59.23% – 28.42%*
Ours (WRN-70-16) 69.15% 38.97% 37.70%
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6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we performed a systematic analysis of many different aspects surrounding adversarial
training that can affect the robustness of trained networks. The goal was to see how far we could push
robust accuracy through adversarial training with the right combination of network size, activation
functions, additional data and model weight averaging. We find that by combining these different
factors carefully we can achieve robust accuracy that improves upon the state-of-the-art by more
than 6% (in the setting using additional data on CIFAR-10 against `∞ norm-bounded perturbations
of size  = 8/255). We hope that this work can serve as a reference point for the current state of
adversarial robustness and can help others build new techniques that can ultimately reach higher
adversarial robustness.
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A ADDITIONAL DETAILED RESULTS
Table 6: Clean (without perturbations) and robust (under adversarial attack) accuracy obtained by different
network sizes trained on CIFAR-10 (with and without additional unlabeled data) against `∞ norm-bounded
perturbations of size  = 8/255.
CIFAR-10 with 80M-TI
SETUP CLEAN ROBUST CLEAN ROBUST
NETWORK WIDTH AND DEPTH
WRN-28-10 84.85±1.20% 50.80±0.23% 90.93±0.25% 58.41±0.25%
WRN-28-15 86.91% 51.79% 91.71% 59.81%
WRN-28-20 86.87% 51.78% 91.63% 59.90%
WRN-34-10 86.42% 51.18% 91.45% 58.52%
WRN-34-15 86.40% 51.12% 91.84% 59.61%
WRN-34-20 87.32% 52.91% 92.14% 60.90%
WRN-40-10 86.27% 51.89% 91.47% 59.47%
WRN-40-15 86.94% 52.18% 91.66% 60.44%
WRN-40-20 86.62% 53.19% 91.98% 60.97%
WRN-46-10 85.98% 52.02% 91.71% 59.40%
WRN-46-15 86.73% 52.74% 91.78% 60.56%
WRN-46-20 87.22% 53.24% 92.08% 61.14%
Table 7: Clean (without perturbations) and robust (under adversarial attack) accuracy obtained by weight
averaging decay values trained on CIFAR-10 (with and without additional unlabeled data) against `∞ norm-
bounded perturbations of size  = 8/255.
CIFAR-10 with 80M-TI
SETUP CLEAN ROBUST CLEAN ROBUST
MODEL WEIGHT AVERAGING
No weight averaging 84.85±1.20% 50.80±0.23% 90.93±0.25% 58.41±0.25%
Decay parameter τ = 0.95 85.48% 50.46% 91.07% 58.12%
τ = 0.9625 85.80% 50.53% 91.28% 58.23%
τ = 0.975 86.34% 50.65% 91.03% 58.37%
τ = 0.9875 83.47% 51.45% 91.09% 58.33%
τ = 0.99 83.41% 51.37% 91.51% 58.69%
τ = 0.9925 86.08% 51.44% 91.23% 58.74%
τ = 0.995 84.41% 52.10% 90.28% 59.14%
τ = 0.9975 84.91% 52.31% 91.28% 58.19%
τ = 0.999 84.62% 52.21% 91.66% 57.16%
Table 8: Clean (without perturbations) and robust (under adversarial attack) accuracy obtained by different
activations trained on CIFAR-10 (with and without additional unlabeled data) against `∞ norm-bounded per-
turbations of size  = 8/255.
CIFAR-10 with 80M-TI
SETUP CLEAN ROBUST CLEAN ROBUST
ACTIVATION
ReLU 84.85±1.20% 50.80±0.23% 90.93±0.25% 58.41±0.25%
Swish/SiLU 85.60% 51.40% 91.03% 59.54%
Leaky ReLU 85.21% 51.00% 90.77% 58.55%
ELU 81.87% 49.20% 89.13% 56.48%
Softplus 83.59% 50.61% 89.87% 57.83%
GELU 83.05% 50.66% 91.09% 59.37%
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Table 9: Clean (without perturbations) and robust (under adversarial attack) accuracy obtained using ratios
of labeled-to-unlabeled data on CIFAR-10 and 80M-TI against `∞ norm-bounded perturbations of size  =
8/255.
CIFAR-10 with 80M-TI
SETUP CLEAN ROBUST CLEAN ROBUST
WEIGHTING OF UNLABELED DATA (ratio of labeled-to-unlabeled data per batch)
10:0 (more labeled data) 84.85±1.20% 50.80±0.23% – –
9:1 – – 88.60% 51.79%
8:2 – – 86.74% 53.27%
7:3 – – 90.37% 56.58%
6:4 – – 90.85% 57.19%
5:5 – – 90.93±0.25% 58.41±0.25%
4:6 – – 91.06% 59.04%
3:7 – – 90.99% 59.36%
2:8 – – 90.69% 59.13%
1:9 (more unlabeled data) – – 90.57% 58.06%
Table 10: Clean (without perturbations) and robust (under adversarial attack) accuracy obtained by different
learning rate schedules trained on CIFAR-10 (with and without additional unlabeled data) against `∞ norm-
bounded perturbations of size  = 8/255.
CIFAR-10 with 80M-TI
SETUP CLEAN ROBUST CLEAN ROBUST
LEARNING RATE SCHEDULE
Multistep decay 84.85±1.20% 50.80±0.23% 90.93±0.25% 58.41±0.25%
Cosine 83.90% 47.49% 91.28% 57.87%
Exponential 83.39% 47.73% 91.08% 56.56%
20
